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The Impact of Wage Bargaining Regime on Firm-Level 
Competitiveness and Wage Inequality: The Case of Ireland 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper uses a linked employer-employee dataset to analyse the impact of 
institutional wage bargaining arrangements on levels of average labour costs and 
within firm wage dispersion in private sector corporations in Ireland. Average labour 
costs are taken as a proxy measure for firm-level competitiveness, while dispersion 
measures the extent of wage inequality within the firm. Average labour costs can be 
thought of as a health measure relating to both the firm and, by extension, the wider 
economy, while dispersion relates more closely to employee wellbeing and, more 
particularly, the relative position of low paid workers in firms operating within one of 
the fastest growing OECD economies.   
 
It is important to note that the questions addressed here go beyond that of the impacts 
of trade union membership on firm-level performance and inequality as, due the 
nature of wage bargaining arrangements in Ireland, and continental Europe more 
generally, the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining regimes far 
exceeds the proportion who are members of trade unions (Hartog, 2002). While 
collective wage bargaining processes will be the primary channel through which trade 
unions impact wage levels, this is not to say that there are no additional influences 
deriving from firm trade union density. However, within a multivariate framework 
these additional influences can be thought off as separate to those derived from the 
wage bargaining process itself. This paper adds to the limited literature in this area by 
considering theses issues within an Irish context. The study also provides some 
assessment of the extent to which the impact of wage bargaining regimes differs 
across privately-owned indigenous firms and multinational companies (MNC’s). 
 
Context and Literature  
 
Since 1987, wage bargaining in Ireland has been centralised at the national level, 
through a process known as Social Partnership. This partnership approach, which 
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involves voluntary negotiations between the Government, main employer bodies and 
trade unions1, was introduced by the Government at this time to assist it in moving 
the country out of the bleak economic situation that it found itself in; a period 
characterised by high inflation, weak economic growth and, subsequently, 
considerable unemployment, mass emigration and unsustainable government 
borrowing and national debt2. There have been nine agreements to-date3, each of 
which has been tailored to medium term national economic and social needs, and has 
often built on its predecessor. Initially, pay and wage issues were the core elements of 
the negotiated agreements; specifically moderate wage increases in exchange for 
reductions in income tax to boost take-home pay. However, as the country recovered 
and moved into the ‘Celtic Tiger’ era, the partnership nature of the agreements 
became deeper and their coverage was extended to include various social and welfare 
issues that either emerged or become more prominent as the economy prospered.  
 
The national pay agreements that have been negotiated through Social Partnership 
have been identified in a number of studies (Sexton & O’Connell (1996), Lane 
(1998), Sweeney (1998), Aust (1999), O’Donnell (1999), Hardiman (2000), Teague & 
Donaghey (2004), Baccaro & Simoni (2007), O’Donnell (2008)) as having played an 
important role in the remarkable revival in the Irish economy that has taken place in 
the last two decades4. In particular, most of this research indicates that the wage 
restraint attained under the pay agreements enhanced the country’s competitiveness, 
through lower labour costs, and this consequently led to both significant employment 
and economic growth. Figure 1 illustrates that real unit labour costs in Ireland have 
fallen in most years since the Social Partnership process began in 1987, and are well 
below those in the rest of the European Union (EU) and United States. Over the 1987-
2002 period, unit labour costs fell by around 25 per cent in Ireland compared to, 
                                                 
1 In 1996 the Government extended the list of social partners eligible to participate in the negotiation of 
national agreements to include various voluntary and community groups.  
2 Ireland had one of the highest budgetary deficits in the European Community (EC) in 1987, 10.7 per 
cent of Gross National Product (GNP). In addition, it had a national debt in excess of 120% of GNP, an 
unemployment rate of 18.5 per cent, net emigration close to 30,000 (which was equivalent to the 
natural increase in the population at this time), GDP per capita that was only 64 per cent of the EC 
average and very high interest rates (Department of the Taoiseach, 1987).   
3 The most recent was agreed in October-November 2008. 
4 In the Netherlands, a form of corporatism, similar to Ireland’s Social Partnership model, has been 
identified with having contributed significantly to the ‘Dutch Miracle’ (Visser & Hermerijck, 1997; 
Visser, 1998).  
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approximately, 10 per cent across the EU. Thus, this would seem to suggest that the 
wage increases that have been attained under Social Partnership have been modest 
enough to boost Ireland’s international competitiveness.  
 
Furthermore, a few authors (for example, Lane (1998) and Aust (1999)) have 
suggested that, in addition to Ireland’s low corporation tax rate and highly educated 
workforce, some MNC’s were attracted to locate in Ireland because of its improved 
cost competitiveness, along with the relatively stable industrial relations environment 
that Social Partnership gave rise to. The attraction of MNC’s to Ireland through 
foreign direct investment (FDI)5, has also been identified as having played a very 
important role in Ireland’s economic transformation (see, for example, Barry (1999), 
Barry et al. (1999) and OECD (1999, 2008)), and it continues to be a significant 
contributor to the economy’s performance through both output and employment. For 
example, the number of individuals employed in manufacturing in MNC’s in Ireland 
has grown from almost 74,000 in 1986 to 109,000 in 2005, a 48 per cent increase. 
Thus, MNC’s share of total manufacturing employment in Ireland has increased over 
this period from 35 to just under 50 per cent (Figure 2)6. Finally, Tansey (1998) and 
Gunnigle & McGuire (2001) also raise the possibility that centralised bargaining has 
helped improve the competitiveness of multinationals in Ireland. 
 
While the literature has alluded to the benefits of Social Partnership in Ireland’s recent 
economic success, specifically through the national wage agreement (NWA) 
component of the process, due mainly to a lack of data, there appears to be no 
previous empirical analysis of its direct impact on Ireland’s competitiveness7. 
                                                 
5 The term MNC’s and FDI are used interchangeably throughout the paper. 
6 This employment data came from the Census of Industrial Production (CIP), which is produced by the 
Central Statistics Office (CSO), and 2005 is the most recent year for which data is available. 
Unfortunately, we do not have data from this source on nationality of ownership for the services sector. 
However, data available from Forfás (Ireland’s national policy and advisory board for enterprise, trade, 
science, technology and innovation) indicates that the number of individuals employed in FDI-owned 
services companies increased from 2,945 in 1986 to 153,508 in 2007, a growth of 52 per cent (Forfás, 
1995, 2007). This data, however, only relates to FDI firms that received government support and, 
therefore, will underestimate the total.  
7 Fitzgerald (1999, 2000), however, looked at wage formation in Ireland between 1962 and 1994, using 
national aggregate data, and concluded that the slow down in real wage growth observed after 1980 
was due to “market forces” as opposed to centralised wage bargaining. He argued instead that the main 
contribution of Social Partnership to Ireland’s economic turnaround has been in bringing about 
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However, there are grounds to believe that Social Partnership will lead to lower 
labour costs, particularly for MNC’s. Leahy & Montagna (2000) develop a theoretical 
framework which predicts that MNC’s may prefer to locate in countries with 
centralised bargaining, due to the gain in competitiveness associated with wage 
setting aimed at securing the interests of domestic firms. In the model, unions will 
choose to limit the rent extracted from the MNC in order to preserve employment 
levels in the less competitive domestic firms.  Leahy & Montagna (2000) argue that 
there may be a welfare loss to the economy in situations where the MNC’s compete 
directly with domestic firms; however, they suggest that this is unlikely to be the case 
in Ireland where FDI has mainly occurred in sectors that did not have a substantial 
domestic component.  Baccaro & Simoni (2007) also argue convincingly that by 
linking wage growth in the high value added MNC’s sector with that in the less 
competitive domestic component of the Irish economy, centralised wage bargaining, 
through the NWA, will have substantially enhanced the competiveness levels of 
MNC’s. However, the authors only provide some descriptive support for their 
argument8.  
 
In relation to wage dispersion, a number of studies have shown that countries with 
centralised wage bargaining have significantly lower levels of earnings inequality 
(OECD, 1997). These results have led to some degree of acceptance of the hypothesis 
that coordinated wage bargaining limits growth in inequality. Thus, a potential 
secondary impact of Social Partnership, and more specifically its NWA component, 
may have been to reduce earnings inequality. However, the evidence for Ireland is 
somewhat mixed. Barrett et al. (1999) found that there was a large growth in earnings 
dispersion in Ireland between the commencement of Social Partnership in 1987 and 
1994. The authors concluded that centralised wage setting was not sufficient to limit 
the growth in earnings inequality. Further analysis by Barrett et al. (2002) 
demonstrated that wage inequality stabilised in the mid-1990s, a result they attributed 
in part to a marked increase in high-skilled inward migration. More recently, 
McGuinness et al. (2009) found that wage inequality fell for Irish men between 1994 
                                                                                                                                            
industrial peace as opposed to moderating wage increases, and hence improving the country’s 
competitiveness (see also Bradley et al., 1991). 
8 While not explicitly reporting a link with competitiveness, Radulescu & Robson (2006) report some 
tentative evidence that co-ordinated wage bargaining systems can help reduce any deterrent effect of 
high levels of trade union density on MNC’s location decision. 
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and 2001, and for females between 1997 and 2001. The authors partially attributed the 
female result to the introduction of the minimum wage in 2000, a policy measure that 
was introduced through Social Partnership. However, while McGuinness et al. (2009) 
do not directly address the issue, it cannot be ruled out that the reduction in wage 
inequality observed over the period in question may be due, in part, to centralised 
wage bargaining. 
 
From a wider international perspective, while there is a great deal of literature relating 
to trade union effects on earnings, both in the context of a wage premium (Freeman & 
Medoff (1981), Lewis (1986), Stewart (1987), Schumacher (1999), Forth & Millward 
(2002)) and wage dispersion (Freeman (1982), Blau & Kahn (1996) DiNardo et al. 
(1996), Card et al. (2003), Dustmann & Schönberg (2004)), much less is known with 
respect to the impact of bargaining regimes on firm-level wage dispersion and even 
less on measures of firm competitiveness9. Existing evidence is mostly restricted to 
European countries, presumably due both to the absence of such institutional 
arrangements elsewhere in the world and/or a lack of available data. Regarding wage 
inequality, for Germany, Gerlach & Stephan (2005) found, for blue collar workers, 
lower levels of dispersion in firms implementing industry-level agreements10, while 
Kohn & Lembake (2007) reported that industry and firm-level bargaining resulted in 
lower levels of wage dispersion relative to individual-level bargaining. Domínguez et 
al. (2004) found that firm-level agreements had a negative impact on firm-level wage 
dispersion in Spain compared to industry-level agreements. Finally, Plasman et al. 
(2007), who examined bargaining regimes in Belgium, Demark and Spain, reported 
higher (lower) levels of wage inequality associated with firm-level bargaining in 
Belgium and Denmark (Spain), and argued that this disparity in results may be 
accounted for by cross-country variations in the goals of trade unions.  
 
Turning to the impact of bargaining regime on average labour costs, Kohn & 
Lembake (2007) found higher average wages in German firms implementing both 
firm and industry-level agreements. Again for Germany, Guertzgen (2006) compared 
                                                 
9 There is also an extensive body of research that looks at the impact of collective bargaining regimes 
on macroeconomic performance indicators. Aidt & Tzannatos (2008) provide a recent systematic 
review of the empirical research in this area, along with the relevant theoretical literature.  
10 See also Stephan & Gerlach (2005). 
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the impacts of industry and firm-level agreements and found a small wage premium 
for industry-level bargaining in West Germany and firm-level bargaining in the East. 
Some further evidence can be taken from the impact of bargaining on individual wage 
outcomes; Card & De la Rica (2006) reported a premium to individuals covered by 
firm-level bargaining in Spain relative to those covered by industry agreements. 
Plasman et al. (2007) also found that in Belgium, Denmark and again for Spain, that 
firm-level agreements resulted in a wage premium relative to workers covered by 
industry-level bargaining.  
 
Data and Methods 
 
The data used in this study comes from the 2003 National Employment Survey 
(NES). The 2003 NES is a matched employer-employee workplace survey, covering 
both the public and private sectors, which was carried out by the Irish Central 
Statistics Office (CSO)11. The employer sample was drawn from the CSO’s Central 
Business Register. Selected firms were then asked to extract a systematic sample of 
employees from their payrolls. Approximately 6,500 private sector employers and 300 
public sector bodies were surveyed across the economy. Within this, a total sample of 
60,000 employees were included from the private sector and 29,000 from the public 
sector. In total 54,000 returns were received.  
 
The employer questionnaire requested information on employee earnings12, hour’s 
worked and occupation. Information was also obtained on ownership type13, firm size, 
industry, use of pay agreements, percentage of employees covered by the minimum 
wage and provision of certain employee benefits, specifically career breaks and work-
sharing and/or part-time work. With respect to the pay agreements information, 
                                                 
11 Only employers with more than three employees were surveyed and the data were collected at the 
enterprise level. While the NES was of enterprises with 3 plus employees, the results were calibrated to 
the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) employment data for employees (excluding 
agriculture, forestry and fishing), which covers all employees.  
12 The earnings information collected in the 2003 NES represents the gross monthly amount payable by 
the organisation to its employees, and relates to the month of March in 2003. This includes normal 
wages, salaries and overtime; taxable allowances, regular bonuses and commissions; and holiday or 
sick pay for the period in question. It does not include employer’s Pay Related Social Insurance (PRSI), 
redundancy payments and back pay.  
13 The “ownership” variable allows us to distinguish public and private sector organisations, and, inter 
alia, within the private sector  between indigenously owned and subsidiaries of foreign companies.   
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employers were asked to indicate the proportion of their workforce covered by the 
following types of agreement:  
 
i) Individual-level 
ii) Business-level 
iii) Industry-level 
iv) National-level (NWA) 
v) Other  
 
Clearly, business, industry and national-level represent the various types of collective 
wage bargaining. 
 
Employees were issued with a separate questionnaire within which they provided 
information on their age, gender, educational attainment, family status, employment 
status (part-time or full-time), length of time in paid employment, length of service 
with current employer and also other job-related characteristics (for example, trade 
union membership, shift-work, supervisory role, and flexi hours).  
 
The dataset at hand does not allow an assessment of the impacts of bargaining 
agreements on individual-level earnings as we cannot be certain (below a 100 per cent 
threshold) that a specific form of wage bargaining covers an individual. Given this, 
the key aim of this paper is to assess the impact of institutional wage bargaining on 
firm-level average labour costs and wage inequality. To assess the impact of 
bargaining on average labour costs, we retain one observation per firm and derive a 
number of variables that we use to explain both average labour costs and wage 
dispersion. We apply establishment-level weights to these firm-level observations to 
ensure that our results are representative. Given that the NWA is the governing wage 
bargaining strategy used in the public sector in Ireland, suggesting little variation in 
this component of the data, the study is restricted to private sector firms. Once this 
adjustment is made to the data we are left with a sample of 3,755 firms employing 
275,570 employees. Of the firm sample, 414 are MNC’s and 3,341 indigenous firms, 
each respectively employing 93,025 and 182,545 individuals.  
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An advantage of focussing on firm-level impacts is that while it is not certain that 
statistically significant individual-level wage effects translate to comparable firm-
level effects, we can be more confident that any firm-level impact will be indicative of 
the wage consequences for the majority of relevant workers within the firm. More 
importantly, from a policy perspective this approach also allows us to assess the 
extent to which average labour costs are affected by wage bargaining arrangements 
and therefore their potential impact on competitiveness.  
 
In addition to average wage level impacts, we also assess the effect of various forms 
of bargaining on wage dispersion within the firm. A priori, we would expect firms 
implementing forms of collective bargaining to have more compressed wage 
distributions; however, it is less clear to what extent wage compression varies by the 
mode of collective bargaining. As a dependant variable in this analysis we opt for the 
coefficient of variation as such a dimensionless measure is preferable when making 
comparisons across firms with widely varying wage distributions.    
 
Results 
 
The following section provides a descriptive assessment of the extent to which modes 
of wage bargaining vary by firm size, ownership (foreign versus indigenous) and 
sector.  
 
The first column in Table 1 looks at the average coverage rate of the various types of 
agreement across all private sector firms. Individual-level agreements constitute the 
dominant wage bargaining mechanism in the private sector with, on average, 49 per 
cent of employees within the typical firm covered by such agreements. The average 
coverage level of the NWA was 30 percent, while industry and business-level 
agreements each had an average coverage level of less than 10 per cent14. However, 
the average in this case is misleading as it is not the case that firms typically 
implement a mix of different types of agreement. Specifically, as the second column 
of Table 1 indicates, within firms’ one form of wage agreement tends to dominate. 
                                                 
14 Due to differences in the average employment size of firms implementing various forms of 
bargaining, these figures will not correspond to the percentage of the workforce covered by each type 
of agreement.  
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For instance, for those firms implementing the NWA to any degree, the average 
coverage rate within the firm is just below 90 per cent. This point is further illustrated 
by the fact that taking a 70 per cent employment coverage cut-off point, only 12.3 per 
cent of firms do not implement a single form of agreement above this level. The 
remaining distribution of firms implement the various forms of agreement at the 70 
per cent cut-off point were as follows: 43 per cent for an individual-level agreement, 
28 per cent the NWA, 7 per cent for both business-level and industry-level 
agreements and 2 per cent for other. Consequently, given that the overwhelming 
majority of firms adopt a particular form of wage agreement for more than 70 per cent 
of their workforce, we use cut-off points as the baseline for the analysis undertaken in 
the paper. The 12.3 per cent of firms not implementing a single bargaining strategy 
above the 70 cut-off point forms the comparison group for the study, which we 
consequently refer to as the ‘no majority’ grouping. 
 
Table 2 reports the average proportion of employees covered by each bargaining 
arrangement by firm size at the 70 per-cent employment coverage cut-off point. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, individual-level bargaining is more heavily implemented by 
smaller firms, while collective bargaining arrangements, in particular the NWA are, 
on average, more heavily implemented by firms employing more than 50 workers. 
These results suggest that the share of the workforce employed under the NWA 
(individual agreements) will be higher (lower) than the proportions reported in Table 
1.  
 
With respect to sector, and adopting a similar interpretation as in Table 2, Table 3 
shows that individual-level bargaining is dominant in the Business Services and 
Transport & Communications sectors, the NWA is somewhat over-represented in 
Manufacturing, while industry-level agreements are most important within the 
Construction sector. 
 
Finally, Table 4 looks at the incidence of bargaining agreement by ownership type. 
Interestingly, while the generally accepted view suggests that MNC’s are more likely 
to adopt individual-level bargaining and are, therefore, less inclined towards 
collective forms of wage determination, the results suggest that the opposite is in fact 
the case in the Irish context. MNC’s were found to be somewhat less likely to 
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implement individual-level bargaining at the 70 per cent threshold, and were more 
likely to adopt the NWA and business-level agreements relative to indigenous firms.  
 
Multivariate Analysis 
 
Moving onto the econometric analysis, our specifications are based around the 
assumption that just as individual-level wages are primarily determined by the amount 
of human capital accumulated, average labour costs within the firm will be driven by 
the education profile of the workforce. Such factors are also important with respect to 
earnings inequality, as we would expect the distribution to be more dispersed in firms 
employing workers across a range of skill levels. Give this, we estimate the following: 
 
1 2 3Y H F Bgnα β β β ε= + + + +   (1) 
 
1 2 3H F Bgnσ α β β β ε= + + + +  (2) 
 
where Y  represents average firm labour costs, σ represents the coefficient of 
variation, H  the mean human capital characteristics of the workforce, F firm-level 
characteristics, Bgn  the form of wage bargaining adopted with a coverage rate at/or 
above a specified cut-off point and ε the error term. In terms of the human capital 
controls, where the individual-level information is based on a binary variable the firm-
level value is expressed as a share, otherwise an average value is included. The firm-
level controls included within the model relate to ownership type, trade union density, 
firm size, mode of production and sector.   
 
Despite the earlier discussion, we are conscious of the fact that the method of wage 
bargaining may still be correlated, at least to some extent, with trade union density 
and the inclusion of this control in our model may serve to obscure the wage impacts 
of particular modes of bargaining. As a robustness check, we re-estimated the average 
labour cost models in a specification that excluded trade union density and the results 
hold. As an additional precautionary measure, we attempt to explicitly control for the 
possibility that our estimates could be prone to bias if the wage bargaining approach 
used is correlated with firm-level characteristics, such as trade union density, etc., that 
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are in turn associated with higher/lower labour costs. To account for such effects we 
follow Card & De La Rica (2006) by including the predicted probability (i.e. 
propensity scores) of adopting various forms of bargaining arrangements as controls 
within the firm-level regression.  
 
We estimate our models at a series of cut-off points - 70, 80 and 90 per cent - to 
control for the possibility that the impacts become more pronounced the higher the 
agreement coverage level within the firm. We ensure that the base case remains 
consistent across the three specifications by excluding those firms with 70 to 79 per 
cent coverage from the 80 per cent regression and those firms with a 70 to 89 per cent 
coverage from the 90 per cent regression. Thus, the base case for our all models 
consists of the 12.3 per cent of firms that do not implement any single type of 
bargaining arrangement for more than 70 per cent of their workforce. 
 
The results from the OLS average labour cost model with the bargaining variables 
constructed above the 70 per cent employment coverage cut-off point are reported in 
the first column of Table 5. The results indicate that, relative to the comparison group, 
average labour costs were 8.6 per cent higher in firms implementing individual-level 
agreements and 6.8 per cent higher in firms where wages are determined on the basis 
of business-level agreements. No wage impacts arose as a consequence of the NWA 
or industry-level bargaining. The results change little when the cut-off points are 
raised to 80 and 90 per cent respectively, while the inclusion of the propensity score 
variables increased the estimated impact by less than 5 per cent, which suggests that 
any bias relating to correlations with firm-level effects was relatively limited15. 
Perhaps, not surprisingly, the propensity score controls suggest that the NWA is more 
likely to be implemented in lower waged firms16. This finding that average labour 
costs are highest in firms not covered by collective bargaining arrangements suggests 
that, at least in the Irish Social Partnership context, the NWA acts as a benchmark for 
all other forms of collective bargaining as it constrains average pay growth within 
                                                 
15 Interestingly the union density effect has fallen in terms of significance in the adjusted regression, 
suggesting that this factor may have been affecting the collective bargaining variables in the OLS 
model.  
16 To help ensure proper identification, we include two variables in our probit models, export intensity 
and share of employees working under flexible working arrangements, which are excluded from the 
wage equations. The coefficients and stand errors of the propensity score adjustments are presented in 
Table A1 in Appendix A. 
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such firms to a level below that of firms not covered by collective arrangements. 
Regarding the other covariates, the coefficients all conform to expectations. Average 
labour costs were positively related with the education levels of the workforce, 
average experience, firm size, foreign ownership and trade union density and 
negatively correlated with the part-time employment share and the proportion of the 
workforce engaged in shift work. Finally, on the grounds that average labour cost 
impacts will reflect individual wage effects, Table 5 also suggests that individuals 
employed in firms where trade unions bargain directly with the employer do 
considerably better than those in similar firms where the trade union opts for wage 
bargaining through the NWA framework. 
 
Table 6 reports the results from the wage dispersion regressions. The models are again 
well specified with wage dispersion increasing with the share of educated labour, and 
higher in larger firms and those in the foreign-owned sector. As expected, within firm 
wage inequality was inversely related to levels of trade union density.  In addition, the 
higher the proportion of the workforce made up of part-time and shift workers the 
lower the level of wage dispersion, reflecting the fact that wage levels will vary less in 
firms with high proportions of relatively low skilled workers. Even after controlling 
for the effects of trade union density, we still find that bargaining arrangements have 
differential impacts on the wage distribution. The results indicate that wage inequality 
is lower in firms implementing the NWA or industry-level agreements, providing 
further support for the view that collective bargaining arrangements reduce within 
firm levels of wage inequality. However, while the results are only significant at the 
10 per cent level, they are relatively stable with respect to the extent of agreement 
coverage. 
 
Given the importance of the foreign-owned sector in Ireland, and the hypothesis 
linking FDI and collective wage bargaining frameworks, we examine the extent to 
which wage bargaining has differential impacts within this sector by introducing a 
series of FDI interaction terms into our average labour cost and dispersion models. 
The general assumption is that MNC’s have a strong preference for a high degree of 
discretion regarding wage setting, which implies that they will tend not to locate in 
economies that have a heavily centralised wage bargaining system.  
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The results from the average labour cost equation are reported in Table 717. It should 
be noted that the base case for the model now becomes indigenous firms failing to 
implement any form of agreement above the 70 per cent threshold i.e. a range of 
agreements are being implemented18. Within the indigenous sector we again find that 
average labour costs are highest among those firms implementing individual and 
business-level agreements. However, the pattern is somewhat different among 
foreign-owned firms: within the foreign-owned sector average labour costs were 
highest among those implementing a range of agreements; however, in MNC’s 
implementing the NWA average pay levels were almost 17 per cent below the base 
case. The results suggest that labour costs within such organisations are substantially 
below those of other MNC’s implementing other types of agreements, and indeed the 
advantage appears to exceed that of indigenous firms implementing the NWA. The 
evidence suggests that MNC’s implementing the NWA have average labour costs that 
not only fall below those of other multinationals but also lag those in the indigenous 
sector, which indicates that the competitive advantage from locating in a country with 
centralised bargaining go beyond those suggested by the Leahy & Montagna (2000) 
model.  
  
To further investigate this issue, we estimated an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
(Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973), which allows us to assess the extent to which the 
labour cost differential between MNC’s and indigenous firms is narrowed as a result 
of the NWA. The decomposition is standard and can be written as follows: 
 
l l l- ( - ) ( - ) ( -INDMNC MNC IND )MNC IND MNC IND MNC INDLC LC X X Xβ β β α α= + +  (3) 
 
where LC represents average labour costs, IND is firms in the indigenous sector, X is 
a vector of all characteristics (human capital, bargaining regime and firm-level) 
determining labour costs, β is the return to these characteristics and α the intercept 
terms. The first term in the right-hand measures endowment effects i.e. the proportion 
of the gap attributable to characteristic differences, while the second term relates to 
coefficient effects i.e. difference returns to a given characteristic. We assume MNC’s 
                                                 
17 See Table A2 in Appendix A for the details on the propensity score variables. 
18 Such firms are more predominant within the FDI sector, accounting for 15 per cent of the 
distribution.  
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to represent the non-discriminatory regime on the grounds that labour costs are higher 
in this sector; however, our results stand when we take the indigenous sector as the 
base. Furthermore, when estimating detailed decomposition of this nature, we must be 
aware of the identification problem associated with the use of dummy variables where 
the number of categorical dummies exceeds one (Oaxaca & Ransom, 1999). In this 
paper, pay bargaining regime and sector are both potentially affected by this 
identification issue. We have applied the approach developed by Gardeazabal & 
Ugidos (2004) to deal with this problem to the sector dummy variables in our model 
by estimating the decompositions imposing a normalising restriction19. However, due 
to the small number of MNC’s implementing industry-level and other types of 
agreement, it was not possible to estimate the decomposition with the constraint 
imposed on the bargaining regime variables20. Consequently, we instead estimate the 
effects of bargaining regime using the original share values.  
 
We can see from the results presented in Table 8 that the unadjusted average labour 
cost gap between MNC’s and indigenous firms was 35.8 per cent, falling to 12.5 per 
cent once account was taken for differences in characteristics between both types of 
firms. Focussing on the impact on individual variables, the largest factor determining 
the cost gap is due to firms in the FDI sector being, on average, much larger in size. In 
addition, with respect to coefficient effects, the second major driver of the observed 
gap was the higher return to average experience in FDI firms. Most importantly, 
regarding bargaining regime, the results confirm that the adoption of the NWA among 
MNC’s results in an average labour cost gap reduction of almost 6 per cent. In 
addition, the fact that individual-level agreements’ tend to be more wage inflationary 
in the indigenous sector also serves to reduce the gap by a margin of just below 4 per 
cent. The analysis confirms our earlier assertion that the cost advantage to MNC’s 
adopting the NWA exceeds that of indigenous firms. Finally, the analysis indicates 
that trade union density has a greater price effect on average labour costs among 
indigenous firms, which leads to a gap reduction of just over 2 per cent.  
 
                                                 
19 The normalisation of the restriction on the coefficients can be written as follows: . The 
implementation of this restriction leaves the other coefficients unaffected.  
1
0
J
jg
j
β
=
=∑
20 With respect to sector, the constraint was estimated. 
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With respect to wage dispersion, the results are presented in Table 9 and the 
interpretation of the coefficients are as before with indigenous firms implementing an 
arrange of agreements representing the base case. The analysis suggests that in the 
indigenous sector, within firm earnings inequality was significantly lower in firms 
implementing industry-level agreements and the NWA. In the FDI sector, dispersion 
was lowest in firms implementing an arrange of wage bargaining arrangements and 
those implementing industry or national-level agreements. Thus, the pattern regarding 
wage dispersion is somewhat more consistent across ownership categories. However, 
as all effects are relative to a base case, the results indicate that the distributional 
effects of collective bargaining through industry and national agreements on wage 
dispersion are stronger within indigenous firms.  
 
Finally, the analysis shows that MNC’s implementing a range of agreements are a 
somewhat unique category, as they have high average labour costs and relatively low 
levels of dispersion. This suggests that such firms may be concentrating on specialist 
high value added activities such as R&D. Consequently, the failure to separate out 
such firms within the OLS model serves to obscure the impacts of centralised 
bargaining on wage dispersion.  
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the impact of various forms of wage bargaining on firm-level 
average labour costs and wage dispersion in private sector firms in Ireland. The results 
show that average labour costs were higher in firms implementing individual 
agreements and business-level bargaining, and that the NWA exerted a largely neutral 
influence on labour costs. The finding that average labour costs are highest in firms 
implementing individual-level agreements suggests that Social Partnership constrains 
the pay demands of all forms of collective bargaining below that of the non-covered 
sector. The research also indicates that MNC’s implementing the NWA have average 
labour costs that fall below those of other multinationals and many indigenous firms. 
This result suggests that there are potentially large gains, in terms of competitiveness, to 
MNC’s choosing to locate in countries implementing a centralised bargaining system. 
On a more conventional note, the results show that within firm wage dispersion is lower 
in both MNC’s and indigenous firms implementing the NWA or industry-level 
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agreements. However, the wage compression impacts of collective bargaining were 
found to be more pronounced in the indigenous sector. The analysis adds further 
support to the view that collective bargaining reduces within firm wage inequality. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Index of Real Unit Labour Costs (Total Economy) 1987-2003 (Base 
Year=1987)  
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Note: * EU-15 with Luxembourg excluded     
 
Source: Constructed with data from the European Economy, No.6, 2003 
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Figure 2: Irish-owned and Foreign-owned Firms Share of Total 
Manufacturing Employment in Ireland: 1986-2005 
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Source: Constructed with data from the Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) Census of Industrial Production 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Average Wage Agreement Coverage: Overall Coverage and 
Coverage for Firms Adopting a Specific Agreement 
Wage Agreement Type 
 
Overall Coverage 
 
Coverage for Specific 
Agreement 
 
   
Individual-level 48.8 86.5 
   
Business-level 6.8 83.1 
   
Industry-level 8.3 80.5 
   
National-level 29.7 88.5 
   
Other Type 6.4 78.6 
 
 
 
Table 2: Wage Agreement Coverage by Firm Size (70% Cut-Off Point) 
        
 Individual Business Industry National Other Type No Majority Number 
        
Firm Size:        
0-9  53.3 5.2 6.2 23.9 2.4 9.1 1,591 
        
10-19 43.9 7.5 7.1 29.9 2.4 11.1 784 
        
20-49 32.4 7.5 9.2 33.2 2.2 15.9 611 
        
50-99 20.8 8.5 12.4 37.8 2.1 18.8 311 
        
100+ 17.3 6.1 8.2 45.3 2.2 20.9 450 
        
Total       3,747 
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Table 3: Wage Agreement Coverage by Sector (70% Cut-Off Point) 
        
 Individual Business Industry National
Other 
Type 
No 
Majority Number
        
        
Manufacturing 33.5 6.5 5.0 39.7 1.3 14.4 442 
Electricity* - - - - - - - 
Construction 36.9 3.4 24.7 23.7 1.6 10.0 449 
Wholesale & Retail 49.2 6.9 4.9 24.0 2.3 13.0 887 
Hotels & Restaurants 40.9 6.6 9.7 30.0 1.2 12.2 207 
Transport & Communications 55.2 9.8 3.8 20.4 2.2 9.6 279 
Financial Intermediation 50.1 8.6 3.2 26.2 7.6 8.4 188 
Business Services 65.1 7.0 5.2 11.2 3.1 8.6 602 
Education 47.3 5.8 5.1 32.0 4.9 10.6 101 
Health 47.8 7.8 1.8 33.9 1.2 8.6 377 
Other Services 44.8 4.1 7.0 30.3 2.4 11.5 220 
Note: * Results cannot be reported for confidentiality reasons   
 
Table 4: Wage Agreement Coverage in FDI Firms Relative to Non-FDI 
Firms (70% Cut-Off Point) 
 
Wage Agreement Type 
  
FDI 
 
Non-FDI 
 
    
Individual-level  40.0 46.1 
    
Business-level  9.8 5.9 
    
Industry-level  4.8 7.3 
    
National-level  28.5 27.7 
    
Other Type  2.4 23.2 
    
No Majority  14.8 11.2 
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Table 5:  Average Labour Cost Models 
Variable 
OLS  
70% 
Adjusted 
OLS 70%
OLS 
 80% 
Adjusted 
OLS 80%
OLS  
90% 
Adjusted 
OLS 90%
       
Constant 1.850*** 2.389*** 1.858*** 2.296*** 1.859*** 2.200*** 
 (0.036) (0.183) (0.036) (0.184) (0.037) (0.185) 
Average Experience 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Share of Part-Time Workers -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of Junior Cert Quals 0.000 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of Leaving Cert Quals 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Share of Post Leaving Cert Quals 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Share of Third-Level No Degree 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Share of Graduates 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Individual-level Agreement 0.086*** 0.089*** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.080*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Business-level Agreement 0.068** 0.071** 0.060** 0.063** 0.055* 0.057* 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
Industry-level Agreement 0.001 0.006 0.009 0.015 0.014 0.017 
 (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 
National-level Agreement 0.012 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.010 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Other Type of Agreement -0.004 -0.003 -0.020 -0.019 -0.022 -0.022 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) 
       
Average Shift-work -0.166*** -0.135** -0.183*** -0.152*** -0.186*** -0.169***
 (0.030) (0.054) (0.030) (0.050) (0.031) (0.048) 
Average Professional Body 0.403*** 0.303*** 0.409*** 0.304*** 0.405*** 0.349*** 
 (0.036) (0.066) (0.036) (0.078) (0.037) (0.081) 
FDI 0.187*** 0.172*** 0.189*** 0.177*** 0.181*** 0.163*** 
 (0.025) (0.036) (0.026) (0.035) (0.027) (0.036) 
Firm Size 0.104*** 0.089*** 0.103*** 0.093*** 0.104*** 0.092*** 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.013) 
Trade Union Density 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002*** 0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
       
Observations 3,741 3,734 3,591 3,584 3,443 3,436 
R-squared 0.3479 0.3545 0.3508 0.3580 0.3476 0.3539 
 F statistic 76.20 56.39 74.07 54.94 70.00 51.71 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses     
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
          Sector controls included 
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Table 6: Wage Dispersion Models  
Variable OLS 70% OLS 80% OLS 90% 
 
Constant -1.239*** -1.186*** -1.166*** 
 (0.192) (0.183) (0.186) 
Average Experience 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of Part-Time Workers -0.003* -0.003** -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Junior Cert Quals 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Leaving Cert Quals 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Post Leaving Cert Quals 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Third-Level No Degree 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Graduates 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Individual-level Agreement 0.026 0.033 0.027 
 (0.090) (0.087) (0.087) 
Business-level Agreement 0.059 -0.003 -0.046 
 (0.135) (0.133) (0.135) 
Industry-level Agreement -0.232* -0.212* -0.219* 
 (0.128) (0.130) (0.135) 
National-level Agreement -0.161* -0.168* -0.161* 
 (0.093) (0.091) (0.092) 
Other Type of Agreement 0.136 0.105 0.115 
 (0.187) (0.185) (0.186) 
    
Average Shift-work -0.441*** -0.494*** -0.502*** 
 (0.142) (0.138) (0.141) 
Average Professional Body 1.156*** 1.068*** 1.045*** 
 (0.176) (0.173) (0.174) 
FDI 0.476*** 0.443*** 0.344*** 
 (0.114) (0.109) (0.112) 
Firm Size 0.421*** 0.408*** 0.415*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Trade Union Density -0.003** -0.003* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Observations 3,454 3,306 3,161 
R-squared 0.1737 0.1764 0.1745 
 F statistic 25.72 27.01 25.48 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses     
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
          Sector controls included 
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Table 7: Average Labour Cost Models with FDI Interactions 
Variable 
Adjusted  
OLS 70% 
Adjusted  
OLS 80% 
Adjusted  
OLS 90% 
    
Constant 2.316*** 2.234*** 2.144*** 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.186) 
Average Experience 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Part-Time Workers -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of Junior Cert Quals 0.001* 0.001** 0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Share of Leaving Cert Quals 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of Post Leaving Cert Quals 0.001** 0.001** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of Third-Level No Degree 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Share of Graduates 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
    
Individual-level Agreement 0.088*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Business-level Agreement 0.0738* 0.066** 0.061* 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) 
Industry-level Agreement 0.002 0.011 0.013 
 (0.029) (0.031) (0.032) 
National-level Agreement 0.027 0.021 0.020 
 (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Other Type of Agreement -0.011 -0.028 -0.032 
 (0.044) (0.045) (0.046) 
    
Average Shift-work -0.122** -0.139*** -0.155*** 
 (0.054) (0.051) (0.048) 
Average Professional Body 0.307*** 0.304*** 0.347*** 
 (0.066) (0.078) (0.081) 
Firm Size 0.091*** 0.095*** 0.093*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.013) 
Trade Union Density 0.002* 0.002** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI Wage Agreement Interactions:    
FDI*Individual-level Agreement 0.063 0.068 0.058 
 (0.072) (0.073) (0.074) 
FDI*Business-level Agreement -0.011 -0.015 -0.031 
 (0.097) (0.102) (0.105) 
FDI*Industry-level Agreement 0.080 0.091 0.096 
 (0.120) (0.131) (0.136) 
FDI*National-level Agreement -0.165** -0.158** -0.170** 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.079) 
FDI*Other Type of Agreement 0.132 0.146 0.159 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.165) 
FDI*No Majority 0.189*** 0.188*** 0.176*** 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.068) 
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Table 7: continued 
Variable 
Adjusted  
OLS 70% 
Adjusted OLS 
80% 
Adjusted  
OLS 90% 
Observations 3,734 3,584 3,436 
R-squared 0.3573 0.3608 0.3566 
 F statistic 50.07 48.76 45.89 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses     
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
          Sector controls included 
 
 
 
Table 8: Bargaining Regime Wage Decomposition for FDI and Indigenous 
Firms 
Decomposition Summary: 
 
Amount Attributable: 46.9 
     - due to endowments (E): 23.3 
     - due to coefficients (C): 23.6 
Shift Coefficient (U): -11.1 
Raw Differential (R) {E+C+U}: 35.8 
Adjusted Differential (D) {C+U}: 12.5 
Endowments as a Percentage of Total (E/R): 65.1 
  
Detailed Decomposition Information: 
    
Variable Attribute Endowment 
 
Coefficient 
Average Experience 28.8 -0.6 29.4 
Share of Part-Time Workers 1.9 8.6 -6.6 
Share of Junior Cert Quals -2.4 4.3 -6.7 
Share of Leaving Cert Quals -0.7 -3.4 2.6 
Share of Post Leaving Cert Quals -0.2 -1.8 1.6 
Share of Third-Level No Degree 1.4 -3.9 5.3 
Share of Graduates 2.3 1.0 1.4 
    
Individual-level Agreement -3.8 -0.3 -3.5 
Business-level Agreement -1.0 -0.3 -0.8 
Industry-level Agreement 0.4 -0.4 0.9 
National-level Agreement -5.8 -0.6 -5.3 
Other Type of Agreement 0.5 0.1 0.3 
    
Average Shift-work -1.6 -1.4 -0.1 
Average Professional Body 2.8 2.1 0.7 
Firm Size 22.7 20.4 2.3 
Trade Union Density -2.1 -0.1 -2.0 
    
Sub-total (including sector controls): 46.9 23.3 23.6 
Note: Sector controls included     
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Table 9: Wage Dispersion Models with FDI Interactions 
 Variable OLS 70% OLS 80% OLS 90% 
Constant -1.243*** -1.154*** -1.133*** 
 (0.188) (0.184) (0.186) 
Average Experience 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Share of Part-Time Workers -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Junior Cert Quals 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Leaving Cert Quals 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Post Leaving Cert Quals 0.020*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Third-Level No Degree 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of Graduates 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.030*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
    
Individual-level Agreement -0.065 -0.062 -0.056 
 (0.093) (0.090) (0.090) 
Business-level Agreement -0.084 -0.069 -0.083 
 (0.143) (0.140) (0.142) 
Industry-level Agreement -0.308** -0.295** -0.302** 
 (0.131) (0.134) (0.138) 
National-level Agreement -0.214** -0.221** -0.212** 
 (0.096) (0.094) (0.095) 
Other Type of Agreement -0.055 -0.105 -0.100 
 (0.193) (0.192) (0.194) 
    
Average Shift-work -0.405*** -0.437*** -0.460*** 
 (0.139) (0.138) (0.141) 
Average Professional Body 1.140*** 1.055*** 1.037*** 
 (0.176) (0.172) (0.174) 
Firm Size 0.433*** 0.417*** 0.423*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) 
Trade Union Density -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI Wage Agreement Interactions:    
FDI*Individual-level Agreement 1.278*** 1.351*** 1.193*** 
 (0.310) (0.302) (0.303) 
FDI*Business-level Agreement 1.448*** 0.866** 0.592 
 (0.418) (0.423) (0.431) 
FDI*Industry-level Agreement 0.780 1.004* 1.084* 
 (0.523) (0.557) (0.570) 
FDI*National-level Agreement 0.400 0.418 0.427 
 (0.328) (0.323) (0.332) 
FDI*Other Type of Agreement 2.674*** 2.777*** 2.781*** 
 (0.698) (0.677) (0.677) 
FDI*No Majority   -0.415 -0.439* -0.462* 
 (0.267) (0.260) (0.261) 
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Table 9: continued 
Variable OLS 70% OLS 80% OLS 90% 
    
Observations 3,454 3,306 3,161 
R-squared 0.1814 0.1850 0.1821 
 F statistic 24.47 23.97 22.47 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses     
          * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
          Sector controls included 
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Appendix A 
Table A1:  Average Labour Cost Models - Propensity Score Controls 
  
Adjusted 
OLS 70% 
Adjusted 
OLS 80% 
Adjusted 
OLS 90% 
Propensity Score Controls:    
Individual-level Agreement p -0.263 0.004 0.198 
  (0.319) (0.322) (0.331) 
Business-level Agreement p -0.764 -1.255 -0.438 
  (1.596) (1.996) (1.761) 
Industry-level Agreement p -0.136 0.036 -0.352 
  (0.764) (0.746) (0.708) 
National-level Agreement p -1.106*** -1.096*** -0.925** 
  (0.381) (0.387) (0.407) 
Other Type of Agreement p -2.260** -2.167* -1.689 
  (1.117) (1.202) (1.118) 
Individual-level Agreement psq -0.387* -0.570** -0.647** 
  (0.235) (0.238) (0.252) 
Business-level Agreement psq 2.543 5.144 2.527 
  (6.798) (8.397) (7.413) 
Industry-level Agreement psq -0.445 -0.875 -0.368 
  (1.409) (1.432) (1.506) 
National-level Agreement psq 0.657** 0.704** 0.625** 
  (0.299) (0.302) (0.320) 
Other Type of Agreement psq 12.901** 14.573** 11.803** 
  (5.186) (5.903) (5.378) 
 
Table A2:   Average Labour Cost Models with FDI Interactions - Propensity Score Controls 
  
Adjusted 
OLS 70% 
Adjusted 
OLS 80% 
Adjusted 
OLS 90% 
Selection Controls:    
Individual-level Agreement p -0.217 0.031 0.192 
  (0.319) (0.322) (0.331) 
Business-level Agreement p -0.383 -0.843 0.062 
  (1.598) (1.999) (1.767) 
Industry-level Agreement p -0.109 0.114 -0.151 
  (0.763) (0.745) (0.709) 
National-level Agreement p -1.015*** -1.029*** -0.876** 
  (0.383) (0.388) (0.408) 
Other Type of Agreement p -1.883* -1.809 -1.448 
  (1.120) (1.205) (1.120) 
Individual-level Agreement psq -0.361 -0.540** -0.599** 
  (0.235) (0.238) (0.253) 
Business-level Agreement psq 0.000 2.308 -0.337 
  (6.839) (8.438) (7.472) 
Industry-level Agreement psq -0.541 -1.038 -0.742 
  (1.407) (1.431) (1.508) 
National-level Agreement psq 0.575* 0.646** 0.577* 
  (0.300) (0.303) (0.321) 
Other Type of Agreement psq 11.920** 13.497** 11.311** 
  (5.184) (5.901) (5.373) 
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